Does Higher Defence Organisation in India Require a Major Surgery? by Patney, Vinod
 Vinod Patney*
Does Higher Defence Organisation
in India Require a Major Surgery?
Abstract
Amendments and/or modifications in the Higher Defence Organisations of
our country are a subject of constant debate. Many and diverse views continue
to be aired. The common denominator seems to be a general dissatisfaction
with the existing state of affairs. The need to improve on the existing templates
is a laudable thought but the burning question is: ‘Do we require major
surgery?’ Also, must we be taken in by examples of systems that have obtained
in other countries or should we only seek solutions that are more appropriate
to our circumstances? Should we blindly ape what others do or employ our
own genius in fashioning systems that are more applicable to our needs? What
are the changes that could be introduced to advantage? This article addresses
these questions and a few more. The views expressed are personal and not
parochial but they are, possibly and naturally, based on the experiences of the
author after a lifetime of service in our Air Force.
The Debate
Before any form of surgery, major or otherwise to our defense organisation
is countenanced, it behoves us to diagnose what ails the system. We have won
all the wars we have fought/ had to fight, less the 1962 conflict, and that should
in itself be sufficient to show that our organisation is not too bad, and works
almost every time. If a military organization is established primarily to prepare
the armed forces to win wars, our system has stood the test of time. In 1962, our
problem was a lack of proper intelligence, a lack of adequate preparation and
we were surprised by an unexpected Chinese attack. Possibly, we were also a
little unsure as to how to wage that type of war. Be that as it may, the point must
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be made that, given the circumstances; no different higher defense organization
could have turned that defeat into victory. Thus the results of the wars that we
have fought do not make a case for a major change/ surgery in our organization.
Undoubtedly, there are ills in our system that should be addressed. Our
procurement system is slow and laboured. ‘Jointness’, i.e. cross-service
cooperation in all the stages of the military processes amongst our services
could be better. Also the relations between and the mutual confidence of the
services on one hand and the Ministry of Defence on the other should improve.
Regrettably, one possible cause for the current state of affairs is inadequate
understanding of the other(s) point of view and maybe even some amount of
suspicion of intentions. The solutions to bring about improvements in such a
scenario stare us in the face. We need a greater understanding and tolerance as
well as appreciation of differing viewpoints. We must never ever forget, even
momentarily, that we are on the same side. To my mind, this is more of a mental
challenge, rather than an organizational limitation. We can, by mere intent, make
the system work much better. That is what we should do.
The ongoing debate on higher defence management largely deals with three
issues, namely:
• Need for the armed forces to become part of the government and active
players in decision making. Also, for greater understanding to develop,
armed forces officers should occupy berths in the civilian hierarchy and
vice versa. This should be done at both middle and senior levels.
• Need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee (PCCOSC). What should be his duties and
responsibilities?
• Should we adopt the Theatre Command system?
The three issues require careful, individual examination.
Civil/Military Interaction
The proposals regarding cross postings appear attractive and seem to bear a
lot of merit. These proposals can promote better understanding as long as there
is a mutual desire to cooperate and personal differences of varying personalities
do not undermine the system. Also, there is a need to be selective in determining
the berths that the deputationists could occupy. More importantly, it does not
seem desirable for those posted from outside the system to be given decision
making responsibilities. They would lack the basic knowledge and instinctive
understanding of systems in vogue. The best we could hope for is that they
would in fact be able to provide in-house domain knowledge. That will be of
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benefit unless the advice rendered is only subjective. That could happen. Again,
the deputationists may find the work culture somewhat alien and will have to
get used to a new work ethos on joining the new organization and then once
again when they revert back to their parent service.
One other drawback is that as the deputationists will have to revert to their
parent service, they may elect to air only parochial views. The proposal to
introduce deputationists has its limitations but the advantage of ready availability
of professional advice has considerable value and should be encouraged and
the personnel warned of the many pitfalls and even guided to overcome them.
The great plus point of the proposal is that it can be readily implemented without
introducing any major changes and the system can be easily modified or even
abandoned at will. Another thought that could be considered is that where
independent advice from more experienced officers is needed, it may be advisable
to elicit the help of recently retired senior officers whose knowledge is still
fresh and who may not always agree with the views of their parent service.
The other issue is the advisability of making service officers a part of the
government and giving them decision making responsibilities that are
traditionally enjoyed by the civil servants. The thought process behind the
proposal is that service officers with their professional knowledge will better
understand the needs and thereby hasten the decision making process particularly
in procurement of hardware. Here three issues merit examination. Firstly,
supposed inefficiencies cannot be cured by mere change from civilian officers
to service officers manning the berths in the Ministry of Defence. There is a
system in vogue that is tried and tested and whilst improving on it must remain
an ongoing process, major changes could prove to be counterproductive.
Secondly and quite importantly, the essential requirement is training for the
post and continuity in the post and not who mans it. It is recommended that a
high percentage of civil servants in the Ministry of Defence should have had
sufficient exposure to the armed forces either when they join, say by spending a
year or two in armed force units, or whilst in service. This will foster greater
understanding of service systems and requirements. Thirdly and maybe the most
importantly, conscious efforts should be made to better understand the other
side of the picture to foster a firm belief that all are on the same side but working
in individual ways towards a common goal. The tendency that should be
eschewed is the belief/conviction that appointment to a post makes for instant
expertise. Seeking advice and understanding is neither demeaning nor a sin.
For better interaction of service and civil functionaries, major changes in
organisation are unwarranted. Incremental improvements should be a continuous
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process. However it must be emphasized that all should recognize that an
organisation cannot function better than the capabilities of the people manning
it.
CDS/PCCOSC
For the rest of this article, the terms CDS and PCCOSC are used
interchangeably and imply that both designations will carry similar
responsibilities. The CDS will be supported by the existing Integrated Defence
Staff (IDS) and the extant duties of IDS will devolve on the CDS. The writings
on the duties of CDS refer broadly to the following responsibilities:
• This position will be the single point of contact for military advice or
on matters military.
• Administering the Strategic Force Command (SFC). Whenever other
tri-service commands like Special Operations Command, Cyber
Command or Space Command are set up, the Commanders of all these
Commands will report to the CDS.
• The CDS and his/her staff will ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness
in the planning process. This should include both procurements and
operational planning.
• The CDS will help foster greater jointness amongst the services.
As per existing norms, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) reports to the
Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and so do the Commander SFC
and the tri service Andaman and Nicobar Command. One difference is that
unlike in the case of the proposed CDS, the Chairman COSC is not designated
as the single point of contact on military matters. The Chairman is also a
rotational appointment and rapid changes have occurred in the past, changes
that are viewed by some as militating against the minimum desired tenure to
permit continuity. However it is argued that the system has been operating for
many years and the very experienced Chairman COSC, backed by so many
three and two star officers and a considerable staff that comprise IDS, should
not have any difficulty to undertake additional responsibilities. Hence it is opined
that the current system should be left unchanged for the moment. As and when
new tri service commands are established, the institution of a Permanent
Chairman makes sense. He would now be required to oversee and control the
functioning of the tri service commands to meet the needs of all three services.
Chairman COSC may find the workload of overseeing the work of three or four
additional commands whilst retaining the responsibilities of his parent service
as excessive. Should the task of PCCOSC also include the four responsibilities
mentioned above? The paragraphs that follow address this question.
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CDS as Single Point Source for Military Advice
On the face of it, seeking professional advice from only a single source on
all military issues appears to give the source, inherent super human powers of
in depth understanding of all issues concerning the armed forces. This is beyond
what can be expected of a mere mortal. The concept is flawed. We are in an age
of specialization and super specialization and whilst generalists have their place,
it will always be prudent to seek advice from the source best qualified to provide
it. This is particularly so in case of operational plans and recommendations.
The same holds true for procurement recommendations. Corporate decision
making has many advantages. A single individual cannot be the person to be
contacted in every case. If a system of single source of advice is adopted, the
CDS would often have to seek professional guidance from others. His
recommendations would be based on second hand information and if a discussion
ensues or supplementary issues arise, the CDS will be hard pressed to make the
best views available. It should also be recognised that, in the absence of adequate
data, and this is often the case, one has to rely on intuition and intuition can be
a successful product only of firsthand experience. There is no substitute for
experience.
Be that as it may, it is also more than likely that the views of the CDS
would, maybe even unintentionally, be biased. We can and should do better.
Each service has its core competencies and that fact should be recognized and
accepted by all. Within each service there are sub specialisations and in each
case, there will probably be more than one expert. Even the head of a particular
service often seeks the views of more than one individual, discusses the pros
and cons of differing thoughts before arriving at a plan or a recommended course
of action. If this is obtained in a single service environment, the situation is far
more complex in inter service considerations.
One more issue merits consideration. The CDS would be from one of the
three services and it is inadvisable to make this position solely responsible for
the conduct of operations. That should remain in the realm of individual services.
This cannot be over emphasised. The CDS would seek views from the heads of
the three services and he would be more agreeable and amenable to advice
from the heads of services that are not his parent service. However, differences
of opinion could arise where his thinking is considerably different from the
head of his parent service. An avoidable piquant situation could arise.
So the concept of CDS providing a single point of advice should be
considered as ‘still born’.
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Strategic Forces Command
The Strategic Forces Command draws support from all three services. There
is also a need for administrative control of and administrative support to the
Command. As it would be somewhat problematic for the Commander SFC to
deal with all three heads of the services, his reporting to the Chairman COSC or
CDS or PCCOSC stands to reason. However it is a moot point as to whether
any form of operational control should be exercised by Chairman COSC. In our
system, for very good reasons, we have a clear separation between the control
and conduct of conventional operations on one hand and the preparation and,
God forbid, for a nuclear war on the other. It is imperative that the separation is
maintained. The two are very distinct levels of conflict and must be dealt with
separately. We must shun the thought that use of a nuclear weapon is a possible
extension of conventional military conflict. In our scenario, the sole purpose of
nuclear weapons is to deter the use of such weapons against us. That must remain
the cardinal principle.
Again, for good reasons, the security attached to nuclear matters must be of
a decidedly higher order and we should do whatever is possible to ensure that
the systems we adopt are such that no classified information is even inadvertently
compromised. Hence it is strongly recommended that the operational control of
Commander SFC should be exercised by either the National Security Adviser
or the Executive Council of the National Command Authority. In fact it would
be advisable if Commander SFC is invited to become part of the Executive
Council.
Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Planning Process
IDS was intended to be the staff of the CDS. Even without the CDS, IDS
was to report to the Chairman of the COSC. It is now nearly 16 years since the
conception of IDS (Oct 2001). By now all teething problems should have been
overcome and the organization should have been well settled to oversee all
inter-service issues. Unfortunately, the organisation has morphed into an entity
all by itself instead of using the very great expertise posted to it to iron out inter
service differences. The greatest contribution that IDS could have made is to
find unanimously acceptable solutions to vexing problems. They were to also
help find common ground when there were serious differences of opinion.
However, this has largely eluded us.
The Defence Intelligence Agency of the IDS has done good work in providing
Joint Intelligence Assessments and is now a respected organisation. The IDS
has also been successful in finalizing a Defence Space Vision. Many Joint
Committees have been created for better functional efficiency. Some air defence
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issues have found solutions. A Joint Doctrine for the services has also been
released. But, all these were not seriously contentious issues, to begin with. For
instance, the doctrine does not carry a high security grading and hence must be
guarded in its approach. If a doctrine is defined as a set of beliefs, it has little
value in formulating either procurement or operational plans. At best it can lay
down broad concepts and basic principles on the conduct of operations. Is a
doctrine always implementable? Possibly the answer is in the negative. No
doctrine can cater to varied contingences and can never be a dictat on how to
wage wars. Security considerations will prohibit that. Again, the release of a
Joint Doctrine does not automatically imply that it is a stepping stone to the
establishment of the CDS and/or of Theatre Commands. At best finalizing a
Joint Doctrine is a small step and, possibly, shows that on issues that do not
pertain to procurement or operations, a unanimity of views of the three services
can be obtained even if it is time consuming. That seems inadequate.
The major task of IDS should be to fashion and control the procurement
system and to formulate operation plans. Over the years the IDS has worked
hard to streamline the procurement process. It has introduced checks and
procedures to ensure that the Defence Procurement Procedure is adhered to. On
many occasions, it has made sure that a common approach and recommendations
are presented to the Defence Acquisition Council. Some good work has also
been done towards finding commonality in equipment purchases and in making
a single approach to the vendors; independent approaches by different services
for the same equipment has often happened in the past and should not occur
again. All this is good but it is not sufficient.
The IDS does little to formulate the requirements for the services. The Long
Term Perspective Plans of Army/Navy/Air Force are worked out by the individual
service supposedly on the basis of Net Assessments prepared by the concerned
Directorate in IDS and the plan forwarded to the IDS. The IDS merely collates
the plans and produces a document titled the Long Term Integrated Perspective
Plan (LTIPP). It is intended to be a joint plan on the basis of which purchase
proposals can be readied. As it is, the IDS does not examine if the proposals in
the individual plans are indeed based on the net assessments. Again, in the
integrated plan, there are no recommendations made on prioritisation of
purchases. There is little application of mind. Different views are not sought
and thereafter examined to arrive at concrete and studied recommendations
that can be defended. There is little examination as to whether the purchases
sought by different services are conducive to joint operational plans. In this
way the authority of the services is not undermined but then the LTIPP can
hardly be called a joint plan.
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The major limitation in the system followed is that a joint procurement plan
cannot be made based on individual appreciations of what the net assessment
forecasts. The starting point has to be joint planning. A systematic approach
towards this end is needed. It is recommended that each service is tasked to
work out, in cogent terms, its capabilities whilst operating on its own and in
conjunction with the other service(s). This must be the first step. Thereafter
joint planning should be carried out for the contingencies that flow out of the
net assessment or any other contingency. Such joint planning should carry the
commitment of each service that they will be able to bring into effect what they
say they can. That alone can make the planning more meaningful as there will
then be an inherent quasi guarantee of success. The implicit understanding should
be that, if it becomes necessary to put the plans into practice, no service will
step back or make excuses for performance that is short of what was projected
earlier as capabilities. Accountability must be ensured. The planning will thus
be more realistic.
More importantly, it will be a joint plan and point the way towards training
requirements. It is granted that this will be an involved process and a continuous
process but the results will be worthwhile. The plans will then automatically
throw up immediate procurement needs and prioritisation of procurements in
the years ahead. The operational plans and the subsequently arrived at
procurement plans will have the concurrence of all three services. If we are to
attenuate inter service rivalry, the start should be with operational planning that
is based on reality rather than imagined capabilities and requirements. Good
jointness will be a byproduct that will strengthen with time. Joint formulation
of strategy and tactics and the consequent operational planning cannot but foster
better understanding and better jointness.
Some could and do argue that the procedure suggested is much too simplistic
and warfare is far more complex. The author wholeheartedly agrees. For security
reasons, details have been omitted. Also, as the system is fielded and begins to
operate, improvements will suggest themselves. The planning system is an
evolutionary process. But it bears mention that everyone accepts that joint
planning is a pre-requisite for effective execution of a modern war and
progressive modernization is essential. The procedure outlined meets both
requirements. A logical approach has been recommended – first plan and then,
allow the planning process to decide on procurement priorities. It must be again
emphasized that the planning process has to be complex and ongoing and not a
one-time activity. Security considerations are likely to arise but as the planning,
by itself, is carried out jointly and only the execution of plans are devolved to
individual services, the security issue can be easily contained. Again, as there
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will probably be many plans and sub plans for each contingency, security is
ultimately strengthened as the choice of plan to adopt will be taken at the last
moment. A full time planning team is needed and the work of this team will be
as important during peace as it will be during war.
The procedure outlined has not been attempted so far and it is likely that it
will be met with strong resistance. Possibly a Governmental push may be
required. It has often been mooted that a Government push is needed to introduce
changes in Higher Defence Organisation. The author argues that a push towards
joint planning will work better. Not only is planning for possible wars and how
to prosecute them, the bread and butter of the armed forces but the plans generated
and the manner in which the wars should be fought will automatically indicate
the optimum organisation that will be most suitable to carry out such activities.
Such a study will be based on inputs that are more germane to the armed forces
and are as realistic as possible, as opposed to expressions of imaginary needs
and fears. And maybe no real changes will be required in the end.
When the IDS was created 16 years ago, it was hoped that better inter service
cooperation will result. Unfortunately that has not happened. Turf battles
continue even within IDS. If 16 years of IDS existence and a manning level of
some 300 officers drawn from all three services, headed by an officer of
Vice Chief status who is supported by 5 officers of three star PSO status and
another 24 two star officers, have still left so many shortcomings as mentioned
in the earlier paragraphs, possibly the problem is neither administrative nor
organisational. Instilling of jointness may be the only essential requirement not
being fulfilled. Is it time to think de novo?
Jointness
Innumerable numbers of articles have been written and discussions held on
the absence of jointness in the armed forces and the overriding need to instill it.
Unfortunately jointness means different things to different people. Remedies
abound but jointness has remained elusive. It was thought that with institutions
like the National Defence Academy, Defence Services Staff College and the
other inter service organisations, greater understanding will occur and jointness
will automatically follow. Such optimistic thoughts have been belied. We have
been unable to get rid of ‘turf wars’. This is in spite of the fact that with joint
training institutions greater bonhomie amongst the services has come about but
‘jointness’ is still a long way off.
There have been occasions when the services have been in agreement and
have put up joint recommendations but these relate to essentially administrative
issues like pay commission awards and the like.
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Our history of conflicts since our Independence shows that the level of
cooperation should have been better. A few examples are:
• In the Kashmir War of 1947-48, despite Prime Minister’s advice to the
Army Chief on the importance of Skardu, his air counterpart was not
informed and this delayed the supplies to the besieged and beleaguered
garrison. That led to the surrender and consequent massacre of the
garrison.
• In 1962, while the Government did not permit use of combat air power
which had been deployed and was fully ready for any contingency, the
phenomenal and back-breaking effort by the air transport fleet was
wasted due to poor selection of dropping zones especially at Longju
and Tsangdhar. Their unsuitability was conveyed by the AOC-in-C to
the Corps Commander but the former was over-ruled.
• There was little joint planning before and during the 1965 Indo-Pak
War. The IAF leadership was not aware of our Army’s plan and could
not mesh its plan with that of the Army. Possibly, this resulted in the
fizzling out of quick advance by the Army in Lahore sector on 6
September 1965. The air effort was available for supporting the land
forces but the demands either were not raised or were rejected by the
JAAOCs. This resulted in utilisation of aircraft to around one sortie per
aircraft per day against a planning figure and availability of 3 sorties/
aircraft/day.
• Jaffna University heli-drop soon after the induction of Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) into Sri Lanka in 1987 was a disaster and resulted
in very heavy but avoidable casualties mainly due to lack of joint
planning. The situation changed remarkably with the setting up of HQ
IPKF at Madras and of an Air Force Cell therein.
This is an extremely sad story as one should have expected that we would
learn lessons from our mistakes in each of these conflicts and cooperation would
improve progressively. Some improvements did take place as in the case of the
1971 conflict and the Kargil conflict, but, largely, an unsatisfactory situation
continues to prevail. This is in spite of a 16 year experiment with IDS and the
Unified Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC).
Three issues militate against better jointness amongst the services. Firstly,
there is a lack of adequate understanding of the operational thinking, strengths
and limitations of the other services. This is particularly true in knowledge about
the Air Force. The capabilities of the air force are not well known and hence the
expectations are not realistic. What makes matters worse is that air power is
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inherently difficult to understand. When the air force says that it is unable to
perform a task, it is sometimes mistaken for the air force not wanting to do so.
It is a historical fact that the air force has always come forward to support the
Army or Navy but at times this fact is not appreciated. On the other hand, the
ubiquitous nature of air power is appreciated and there is a clamour for an air
force under command. This goes against the basic principle in the utilization of
air power – unity of command. Jointness will remain elusive unless such cardinal
issues are understood.
Secondly, in spite of so many years of seeking ‘jointness’, the roles and
missions of individual services have not been defined still and the core
competencies have not yet been stipulated. It must be done post haste. This is
an essential pre-requisite. Three independent services have been created because
they have different attributes and core competencies. In the absence of
stipulations of core competencies and defined roles, attempts to encroach into
the others’ domain will continue. Such attempts, often without informing the
concerned service, would obviously end up creating bad blood. It is akin to
poaching on the territory of a sister service. ‘Must guard our turf’ has become a
way of life. Once again, it is the Air Force that bears the major brunt of ‘attempted
encroachment’. Once the core competencies and roles and missions of each
service are well defined and enforced, hopefully by a governmental fiat,
‘attempted encroachments’ should cease. In the view of the author, a
Governmental order stipulating the core competencies and roles and missions
of each service is the single most important remedy to bring about jointness.
With better jointness better cooperation and coordination will follow.
Thirdly, by its very nature, air power has a role to play, often a decided role,
in all types of operations. As a result it is much in demand. The service that
needs air power often does not recognise that the air force capability is finite. It
happens that at times the air effort is not available in sufficient quantity. There
can be many reasons for this from availability to weather to need for prioritisation
of available effort etc. However this is not understood and bad blood is created.
Worse, there is a clamour for air power under command. What is not recognised
is that if the demands for air assets that another service seeks are made available
to the Air Force, better availability and utilization will result as flying operations
are without doubt the core competency of the Air Force. With duplication,
command and control issues and air space management issues raise their ugly
head and give cause to more disagreements.
Possibly a fourth factor is the desire to have all support functions under
command. It is but obvious that such an approach is not conducive to enhanced
jointness.
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Implicit in the four factors described above is the remedy to right the wrongs.
One issue that will probably transcend all others to bring about jointness is joint
planning. The basis of joint planning has to be the recognition of core
competencies and understanding of roles and missions of each service. Again,
this factor cannot be reiterated or re-emphasised often enough. Joint planning
will also bring to light the availability of resources and an understanding of
how and why the dearth of the same should be shared. Besides all this, it is a
foregone conclusion that we must fight together. Some 15 years ago the author
had opined that far more important than planning for joint operations is joint
planning for operations. This is not a play on words but an important
consideration and factor to be kept in mind if we are to succeed. The author still
stands by it and argues that joint planning is the single most important aspect
for inter service cooperation. It is possible that in some circumstances, a single
service operation is the best option. A single service operation is indeed a valid
operation of war as long as it is the result of joint planning. Meaningful and
continuous joint planning will thus bring about ‘jointness’.
Theatre Commands
There were two occasions in independent India where a Unified Command
system was adopted. The first was during the IPKF operations in 1987 (briefly
referred to above). In the early days itself, the Army Commander elected to task
helicopters for a helicopter drop of Army personnel at Jaffna University. The
Air Force element was against it calling it far too risky but was overruled. In the
event all helicopters were damaged. More importantly, a number of lives were
lost. Almost immediately thereafter, an Air Component Commander was
positioned to take charge of deployment and tasking of air assets. The Air Force
elements continued to support the operations but under the control of the Air
Commander. The Unified Command System was however, a failure and
discontinued with.
Andaman and Nicobar Command: The second instance relates to the
formation of the Unified Andaman and Nicobar Command. The Command was
set up in October 2001. One of the objectives was to establish the viability of a
Theatre Command. The functioning over the last 16 years does not give
confidence that a Theatre Command system will be of benefit.
The Unified Command has not succeeded in fostering jointness. Reportedly,
inter service rivalry is as strong as ever. Personnel of each service have to follow
the rules of the parent service even if they are markedly different from the others.
Commonality has not been ensured. The authority of the C-in-C is undermined
as he can try disciplinary cases only of personnel of his parent service. The
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personnel of the other services can be tried by the senior officers of the service
in the Command but if the case has to be referred to someone senior, it is so
referred to respective Service Head Quarters (HQs). Such a situation is not
conducive to good discipline. There is no combined maintenance organisation
but each service has their own. A common communication system does not exist.
Service HQ, possibly perforce, have to deal with the Component Commanders
directly bypassing the HQ of the Command. Land continues to be controlled by
the parent service and permission has to be sought from the HQ of the service
concerned for any planned utilisation. Besides, permission is seldom granted.
The major lacuna is in the operational arena. The Command has a clearly
stipulated task but little means to meet the requirement. The forces deployed
are meagre and it is a moot point if augmentation of forces is inadequate, in
terms of how many and when they can be expected. The C-in-C does not have
enough forces under Command to plan and conduct operational exercises and
test the mettle of his personnel. One wonders how the Command will fare in
war.
The ANC does not have enough forces under command as more forces are
unavailable. Such poverty sharing will be a regular feature if Theatre Commands
are introduced. It will be difficult to carry out meaningful training and operational
planning in many such commands.
It is recommended that the Unified Command be disbanded and we should
revert to the earlier system of placing the forces under the concerned geographical
command. In this way the geographical commands will have to just add on to
their responsibilities but will have the freedom to work out contingency planning
and training schedules as a substantially greater force level will be available. If
after 16 years, there are such drawbacks in the functioning of the Command, it
behoves us to reconsider the setting up of a Unified ANC and to seek other
solutions.
Need for Theatre Commands: An organization or proposed organisation
should be based on perceived needs. It is generally accepted that whilst we
must prepare for a major war to create a deterrent capability, the types of conflicts
in the near future are likely to be of short duration or even near continuous,
event based, low level, sub-conventional operations. For such operations, a
mammoth organisation like a Theatre Command is a gross overkill.
Conventional wisdom also suggests that if a major war were to break out it
would be sharp, intense and last for a maximum of 15 days or so. In wars like
this, air power will have a defining role. Such wars will demand concentration
of air power at different locations at different times for different roles. The radii
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of action of modern day aircraft can be as high as 1500-2000 kms or more. This
implies the ability and maybe the need, to hit targets at long distances rapidly
and repeatedly including the ability to hit targets in the operational area of
responsibility of more than one Command. The aircraft may have to, probably
will have to, transcend the geographical limits of other Commands. Deployment
of aircraft may have to be changed repeatedly, from one sector to another,
depending on the progress of operations. History records how all this and more
was done in previous conflicts, even when our capability was nowhere near as
good as it is today. The situation becomes more complex if we add the actions
carried out by the adversary. Air Defence and offensive operations have to be
conducted with effective synergy. All this must lead to the conclusion that air
operations are markedly different from that of the other two services in terms of
expanse of areas of interest and rapidity with which operations can be mounted.
Strategic agility is a by word of air power. Unity of Command with devolution
of control is an essential characteristic for effective use of air power and must
be respected.
The above paragraph should not give the impression that the air force will
fight its own war. Far from it!! It is again emphasised that joint planning is the
name of the game. The Joint Plan will include the aforementioned tasks for the
air force but not preclude other tasks. A Theatre Command system will introduce
one more level in the control of air power and place a spanner in the work of air
power, arguably the work of the service that will have most to offer. Most
importantly, piecemeal use of air power has never yielded good results. This is
particularly true when the forces available are few. There have been occasions
in the past when control and tasking of particular aircraft in short supply was
carried out directly by Air HQ. There can be other reasons also where Air HQ
will elect to exercise direct control over designated forces.
The underlying conclusion therefore, must be that a Theatre Command
system will serve no useful purpose but would only impede the capability and
potential of air power.
Conclusion
The author sees no justification in introducing either a CDS or Theatre
Command system. Indeed, his argument is that it is contra-indicated. The
essential need is for a better joint planning that may have to be enforced by the
Government. At the same time the cardinal requirement of the hour is that the
Government must take it upon itself to stipulate the core competencies as well
as the roles and missions of the three services.
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There are so many issues demanding the Armed Forces and the Government’s
attention. The need for modernisation is urgent and so is the requirement for
clear cut policies on space, cyber space, special forces etc. These are significantly
consequential issues that should proceed at an accelerated speed. Unnecessary
impediments in the form of rhetorical discussions on CDS/Theatre Commands
should be put to rest once and for all. We simply need a few improvements and
refinements in our Higher Defence Organisation, not a major surgical
intervention.
Does Higher Defence Organisation in India Require a Major Surgery?
